Unpacking the dangers of the proposed amendments to Zambia’s constitution Part II

President Hakainde Hichilema is keen to win the support of members of parliament through inducement, as their votes will determine the fate of his proposed changes to Zambia’s constitution

By Sishuwa Sishuwa

Theme 2. Legalising the use of public resources for election campaigns

The second benefit that President Hichilema seeks to achieve through Bill 7 is getting members of parliament to campaign for his re-election and their own using public resources. The president hopes to achieve this objective by changing how the dissolution of parliament works before the general election. Article 81 (3) of Zambia’s constitution states that “Parliament shall stand dissolved ninety days before the holding of the next general election.” The three months that precede the election serve as the designated period for official nominations and campaigns.

Once parliament is dissolved by operation of law, MPs are no longer MPs and lose access to all the benefits that come with the office. Currently, these include a monthly net salary amounting to K60, 000, a $80, 000 interest-free car loan, and a truckload of allowances that cover their work-related costs such as travel, food, accommodation, sittings, and constituency-level staffing. Dissolving parliament long before the election is important to the democratic process for two reasons.

First, it allows those who were MPs before dissolution to focus on political campaigning instead of being encumbered by parliamentary business. Second, it prevents MPs from using public funds and other resources for partisan activities to the disadvantage of their opponents. Altogether, this creates a level playing field during the campaigns and contributes to the overall integrity of the elections.

Through Bill 7, Hichilema is proposing two amendments to the provisions governing dissolution.

The first proposal is to amend Article 81 (3) to read: “(3) Parliament shall stand dissolved a day preceding the date of the next general election.” The official justification is that this change would ensure that the term of office for MPs is strictly five years, as opposed to the current situation that falls short by three months.

The second proposal is to make MPs retain their position for this additional three-month period but without any official work: “Notwithstanding clause 3, Parliament shall not sit or conduct any business ninety days before the holding of the next general election.”

In making these two proposals, Hichilema has three objectives.

The primary objective is to entice all MPs to support the passage of Bill 7 by dangling a carrot in front of them. If there is anything that Hichilema learnt from his predecessor’s failure to pass Bill 10 in 2020, it is that no matter what the public or civil society says in opposition to an incumbent president’s plans on the subject, constitutional amendment bills are won or lost in parliament. This lesson explains why Hichilema could not embark on these constitutional changes much earlier in his term because he first needed to raise the two-majority support that is required to pass them. In furtherance of this objective, Hichilema worked with his loyalists in state institutions such as the police, the judiciary, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ), and the Registrar of Societies to:

1. hijack and take control of the opposition Patriotic Front (PF) by installing a state-backed faction as the party’s leadership whose very first action was to expel nine PF MPs in an attempt to force a series of by-elections;

2. delay the resolution of the resultant PF leadership wrangles using regime-friendly judges;

3. induce vacancies in several constituencies by using the police to arrest incumbent MPs on what appears to be politically motivated charges and getting regime-friendly magistrates to convict them, often after speedy trials or unusual judicial efficiency;

4. prevent the main opposition party from sponsoring candidates in the ensuing parliamentary by-elections either by manipulating the judicial process or using the Registrar of Societies and the ECZ on the ground that the party first needed to resolve its factional battles; and

5. use incumbency advantage and vote buying to win.

Combined, these legal manoeuvres have enabled the ruling United Party for National Development (UPND) to easily secure new four parliamentary seats in five of the seven constituencies that have held or are about to hold by-elections since 2022. The opposition have retained one seat while the remaining two by-elections are slated for 26 June and 7 August 2025. This abbreviated history of Hichilema’s political schemes provides the clearest evidence that the president had known much earlier that he would take to parliament self-serving and personally-driven amendments to the Constitution rather than implementing his party’s 2021 manifesto that promised to “complete the constitutional reform agenda, anchored on a broad-based consensus among all Zambians” (p.34). Hichilema’s hope is that the UPND will win the forthcoming by-elections before Bill 7 is tabled in parliament to reduce by one or two the number of MPs whom the ruling party might need to bribe to pass the dreadful constitutional changes.

In the meantime, however, the president is offering a more transparent form of bribery that he hopes will appeal to all the MPs: a promise to extend their tenure by three months, as many of them have long demanded. Delaying the dissolution of parliament to 24 hours before the general election would allow MPs to retain their existing lucrative renumerations – an inducement that greatly increases their chances of supporting Bill 7.

The second objective is to enable MPs to campaign for their own re-election using public resources. Campaign finance is ordinarily difficult to raise in Zambia, making attractive any interventions that would help deflate the cost of politics. Moreover, MPs receive constant requests for financial support from their constituents and are required to make monthly financial contributions to their political parties for by-election and day-to-day operational expenses. Allowing them to draw salaries for three months even when they will be doing no official work will significantly contribute to their war chest. In effect, this means MPs will be funded by taxpayers to carry out their political campaigns – another incentive for getting them to vote for Hichilema’s proposed constitutional amendments.

The third objective is enabling MPs to campaign for Hichilema using public funds drawn from the free salaries and the consequent increase in their pension. Currently, lawmakers receive about three million Kwacha (the equivalent of US$110,000) as payment for gratuity in respect of their parliamentary service. Extending the life of parliament for three months would result in an upward adjustment of this amount, making available additional funds that can support their own – and, for ruling party MPs, Hichilema’s – re-election campaigns.

Altogether, the proposed changes would encourage electoral fraud, corruption, or unfair practices during campaigns, and gravely undermine democratic principles such as a level playing field. For instance, challengers, often lacking in financial resources, would find it difficult to unseat incumbent MPs with deeper pockets and who will this time also enjoy the support of official staff in the constituency. Furthermore, the proposals are likely to work to the advantage of the UPND because candidates belonging to parties in government generally find it much easier to attract external financing or more resources from “well-wishers” than candidates of other parties whose campaign budgets usually draw on personal resources.