By Kapya Kaoma
The alleged abduction of PF acting president Given Lubinda in Kabwe is the latest—and most glaring—example of the escalating political intimidation linked to UPND cadres under President Hakainde Hichilema. What makes this incident especially alarming is how quickly sections of the UPND leadership dismissed it as staged—right up until one of their own youth leaders, Kelvin Mwangala, publicly boasted about his role. His justification? That Mr. Lubinda’s mere presence in Kabwe “provoked” UPND cadres. He even questioned whether Lubinda’s movements were “lawful,” as if citizens now need clearance from the ruling party to travel.
This familiar pattern—deny, deflect, then backtrack once evidence emerges—should worry every Zambian. We saw it when UPND cadres raided the PF Secretariat. Initial denial dissolved only after the party’s National Youth Chairman, Gilbert Liswaniso, conceded the truth. These events point not just to undisciplined cadres, but to the political rot that characterize the Hichilema regime.
Anyone who has followed Zambia’s political climate should not be surprised. Cadre violence has stalked the UPND for years. Since taking office, its supporters have been implicated in violent incidents in Kabwata, Ndola, and beyond—often met with leadership responses that were hesitant, vague, or quietly permissive. Under the PF, the UPND lacked control of state power; their cadres were restrained by circumstance, not principle. In government, the same confrontational habits remain—only now with the weight of state authority behind them.
Back in 2022, I cautioned that despite President Hichilema’s claim that “cadrerism is dead,” his political machinery was still powered by shadowy groups operating like underground commanders—cadres who controlled bus stations and neighborhoods by instilling fear, not authority. As the election season draws near, those old networks seem to be reawakening. When governance loses moral authority, intimidation becomes a political strategy.
Political theorists have warned precisely about this slide. Max Weber argued that a state is defined by its monopoly on legitimate force. When ruling parties outsource coercion to their cadres, they erode their own claim to that legitimacy. Hannah Arendt argued that violence surfaces when real power is fading—when persuasion no longer works as is the case with the UPND. Once violence contaminates electoral politics, democracy dies: people don’t vote out of conviction but vote out of fear. Is this the road UPND seeks Zambia to take?
UPND must grasp that fear has an expiration date. Today, some citizens may feel cowed because the ruling party controls the levers of state. But on election day, the equation flips. Police cannot be everywhere. Cadres cannot enforce intimidation at every polling station. When state coercion thins out, the public’s true will breaks through—and when a population has been provoked long enough, its response at the ballot can be swift and unforgiving. In some cases, it is not just political, but physical.
President Hichilema has already tasted the beginnings of this backlash. Reports that some of the people who stoned him in Chingola were UPND members is telling–violence, once normalized, eventually devours its own. A movement that trades in intimidation inevitably becomes a victim of the same tools it deploys. How many UPND members are becoming victims of their own violence?
And how long will Zambians tolerate a political climate where intimidation overshadows dialogue? History shows that citizens may remain quiet for a time—but not forever. UPND cadres would be wise to remember that Hichilema, like every president before him, will not hold power for life. Moreover, the public’s patience is running thin.
