By Sishuwa Sishuwa

Today marks exactly 100 days since Hakainde Hichilema was inaugurated as president of Zambia. After a decade and half in opposition, the leader of the United Party for National Development (UPND) defeated the incumbent Edgar Lungu in elections on 12 August 2021. He took office 12 days later.

Hichilema’s successful election campaign was aided by his opponent’s unpopularity and a set of promises to change course. He vowed to tackle the erosion of democracy and human rights, address high unemployment especially among the youth, and rebuild an economy faltering under the weight of huge debt, government incompetence, corruption, and effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Hichilema also pledged to reverse the breakdown of rule of law, the lack of diversity in public office, a politicised and ineffective civil service, rampant corruption, poor governmental communication with the public, and Zambia’s weakened voice in international affairs.

100 days into the new presidency, there are some hopeful signs of progress on some fronts as well as some highly alarming signs of broken promises on others.

Promising steps

Of promising steps towards progress, many of which are still on paper, five stand out.

First, Hichilema has developed a clear strategy aimed at fixing the economy and its debt crisis through better fiscal management and accountability. Meanwhile, the appointment of the well-regarded Situmbeko Musokotwane as Finance Minister, the internationally respected Denny Kalyalya as Governor of the Bank of Zambia and the experienced Felix Nkulukusa as Secretary to the Treasury strengthen the country’s ability to secure an IMF package. Such a bailout would help Zambia attract foreign direct investment, reassure ratings agencies, and re-negotiate debt payments.

The government’s 2022 budget is also positive and bold. It promises to recruit 30,000 new teachers and 11,200 healthcare staff, increase social expenditure, support small businesses, and invest more attention in agriculture. It also vows to decentralise resources, including by increasing the Constituency Development Fund from K1.6 million ($90,000) to K25.7 million ($1.4 million). And it abolishes school fees for state schools, making good on the UPND’s promise of free education.

Hichilema’s government continues to face several economic challenges, however. In mining, the government has formulated a better mechanism of collecting royalties, which had been a perennial source of conflict with extractives companies. But questions remain, stemming from the previous administration’s takeover of the Glencore-operated Mopani copper mines and its handling of the liquidation of the Vedanta-owned Konkola mines. It remains to be seen whether the new administration will return these mines to previous owners or seek new investors. There are also still question marks over how the government will finance its plans, especially after reducing taxes. It is betting on economic growth and improved revenues from copper, but Zambia’s economy is precarious and failure to reach a deal with the IMF or a fall in copper prices could lead to a dramatic collapse.

Second, Hichilema has greatly improved dialogue between the public and the presidency. Unlike Lungu, who governed through press aides and airport tarmac addresses, the new president regularly hosts press conferences and has appeared on a live phone-in radio show.

Third, Hichilema has presided over a relatively open democratic environment. He has shown greater commitment to civil liberties and stopped the culture of violent political cadres operating in markets and bus stations. It is still early days, but the climate of fear and lawlessness that characterised much of Lungu’s rule is slowly disappearing. One hopes that the arrest of a peacefully protesting Kasonde Mwenda, the leader of a small opposition party, for “conduct likely to cause breach of peace” in September is an isolated incident and not the start of a slippery slope.

Fourth, the new president has restated his commitment to the rule of law. Although he has walked back promises to repeal the repressive Cyber Security Act and the Public Order Act, long used by governments to curtail the activities of the opposition and civil society, Hichilema has maintained plans to review the constitution, enhance judicial independence, and improve the operations of the electoral commission. On corruption, his priority is to recover stolen funds, given that watchdog institutions lack capacity and the judiciary remains compromised.

Finally, the new president has attempted to reposition Zambia on the world stage. Hichilema is repairing the country’s frayed relationship with the West, while being careful to not disrupt ties with China. More significantly, he is strengthening regional ties – particularly with the DR Congo – through diplomatic visits and promoting greater trade and investment within the southern African region and Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement. Hichilema has also used his platform to support democracy in the region – he notably invited opposition figures from Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Tanzania to his inauguration – and speak out against global debt injustice and vaccine inequality.

Alarming signs

Those are some of the positive signs from Hichilema’s first 100 days. The negative signs are, in many ways, much more significant and centre on the new president’s principles. In the election, the UPND tried to set itself apart from the corruption and lawlessness of Lungu’s Patriotic Front (PF). Hichilema’s speeches were dominated by calls for a return to constitutionalism and good governance. It is on these fronts that the last 100 days have been the most concerning.

Here are some examples.

Pardoning corrupt former officials

Hichilema has shown a worrying contradiction in his approach to former officials accused of corruption.

On the one hand, he has said that it is up to agencies such as the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to investigate suspects and potentially prosecute them. This is well and good; the judiciary and executive are separate arms of government.

On the other hand, however, Hichilema has said several times that if former officials return stolen money to the government, they should be given amnesty. It is not clear if this is an instruction or merely advice, but since the president appoints ACC officers – and his predecessor held great sway over the agency – we can assume it will be treated as a directive. This is unconstitutional in a variety of ways. As Hichilema pointed out, he has no legal power to instruct the ACC. The pardoning of officials who may have engaged in millions of dollars’ worth of grand corruption would be a betrayal of justice. And it would also violate the principle that all people are equal before the law.

Under Lungu, the government targeted its opponents with trumped up charges and tried to prosecute them without evidence. Hichilema appears ready to violate the same principle, albeit in the opposite direction; by saving people from prosecution despite clear evidence of wrongdoing.

It is additionally worrying that the new administration has not replaced officials in anti-corruption bodies. Under Lungu, these agencies were spineless and followed political instructions rather than following the constitution. Keeping these personnel in place does not inspire hope that these bodies can now act independently of the executive or hold those in power accountable.

Creating new public offices without following the law

Historically, State House has had five advisors to the president, responsible for press and public relations, economic affairs, political affairs, legal affairs, and policy and project implementation – each assisted by two deputies known as chief analysts. Instead of working through these existing offices, Hichilema has created a series of new advisory positions. These include State House Media Director, Special Assistant to the President for Public Policy, Special Assistant to the President for Policy Compliance, and State House Economic Advisor.

His motivations for doing this may be perfectly legitimate, but these actions have not been constitutional. The president is legally empowered to create new public offices, but only through the relevant commission or a specially designed statutory instrument, which has not been the case. It is also concerning that most of these appointments have not been announced and only a few have taken the oath of office publicly, as required by the constitution.

Weakening the civil service

In opposition, Hichilema vowed to depoliticise the civil service and fill it with qualified, competent, and experienced professionals. While he has yet to announce any reforms that would help achieve this, he has taken several steps that undermine the service.

First, the new president destabilised it through a nearly wholesale dismissal of permanent secretaries, the most senior officials tasked with advising ministers and implementing policies. It is unlikely all those sacked were incompetent, unqualified, or corrupt so their removal was likely due to their perceived political affiliation.

Second, Hichilema has appointed several individuals who lack civil service experience or even relevant qualifications. They appear to have been recruited due to their loyalty and are therefore more like Partisan Secretaries, who will last as long as their party is in power, than Permanent Secretaries.

Third, Hichilema has centralised power by creating several new positions around the presidency in a move that demonstrates his lack of faith in the civil service and his desire to run government from State House. The creation of these parallel positions, many of which already exist in the civil service, undermines existing officials, leads to the duplication of functions, and is an inefficient use of public resources. Worse still, many of those appointed to this “mini civil service” lack the relevant qualifications for their roles.

Undermining the fight against corruption

When it became clear that Lungu had lost the elections this August, the incumbent had initially planned to challenge the results in the Constitutional Court, which was widely seen as biased in his favour. It was only after an unexpected closed-door meeting with Hichilema that he switched tack. In a short, televised address, a visibly subdued Lungu conceded and congratulated his soon-to-be successor.

Moments later, Hichilema delivered his own speech. He welcomed his election victory before addressing Lungu, saying “do not worry; you will be okay, sir”. He later tried to walk back these words, but this remark was widely seen as the public expression of the two men’s private political settlement; namely, that Lungu would drop his planned legal challenge in exchange for immunity after stepping down.

If this is the case, this deal would be deeply inappropriate. It would undermine the Director of Public Prosecutions and law enforcement agencies whose responsibility it is to decide who should be investigated and prosecuted. And it would bypass the National Assembly, the body with the power to remove a former president’s immunity in the face of clear evidence presented by the sitting president.

Failure to reflect diversity

One key criticism of Lungu’s rule was that he marginalised Zambians from Southern, Western and Northwestern provinces – regions that have historically voted for Hichilema. 26 of his 32 cabinet ministers, for instance, were either from the Chewa-speaking Eastern province or from one of three Bemba-speaking provinces. This preference was also seen clearly in the top leadership positions of the police, army, air force, national service, and office of the president.

Hichilema promised to do things differently if elected but has barely delivered. All five heads of Zambia’s security services as well as the top positions in the National Assembly and judiciary are held by people from the regions that have traditionally voted for him. His 27-person cabinet is relatively representative of Zambia’s ten provinces, but areas that have historically voted for PF are grossly underrepresented while 16 ministers come from ethnic groups that have typically formed the core of Hichilema’s base.

The new president’s record on other forms of inclusion is even worse. Even though the constitution calls for equal gender representation in public offices, just five cabinet ministers are women, which is half the figure under Lungu. To address electoral imbalances, the constitution allows the president to nominate eight persons to parliament, but Hichilema filled all the slots with men except one. Only one of Hichilema’s ten provincial ministers is female. He has further made no appointments of either youth, constitutionally defined as someone between the ages of 18 and 35, or persons with disabilities – a clear violation of the constitution.

Looking ahead

For someone elected on the promise to restore constitutionalism and the rule of law, Hichilema’s first 100 days provide little inspiration. Nonetheless, his political position seems secure, for now.

The new president remains popular, though his continued approval will depend on how he navigates the tough conditionalities that could come with an IMF deal. His central bank governor recently announced plans to remove subsidies on electricity, fertiliser, and fuel. If these moves are not carefully phased or strategically communicated, they could lead to urban discontent. This will especially be the case if a public sector wage freeze comes next and Hichilema’s administration is unable to provide employment for the many young people who voted for him.

Unless Hichilema incorporates more figures from underrepresented regions and women into his government, he also remains vulnerable to a political rival that could combine populist policies in urban centres with promises to rural areas that feel marginalised. This effective opposition, however, does not yet exist. The PF is in disarray while other opposition parties are mostly led by elitists without grassroots support or the language to connect with ordinary voters.

Source: https://africanarguments.org/2021/12/the-good-the-bad-and-the-alarming-hichilemas-first-100-days-in-zambia/

By Sean Tembo – PeP President

1. Economy: Putting Zambia on an IMF programme is bad for the country. Already, electricity and fuel prices will go up. Additionally, giving the mines a mineral royalty tax holiday when copper prices are at an all-time high and yet we go to borrow to fund our expenditure needs is not only incompetence but it is treasonous. Hichilema’s allegiance to Zambia should be subjected to a detailed investigation. Score = 0

2. Rule of Law: Hichilema only respects the Constitution when it favors him. Forcing people to take the vaccine is a breach of the constitution, removing former civil servants from payroll before their benefits are paid is a breach of the constitution. Creating new ministries and allowing them to start operating before they’re ratified by Parliament is a breach of the Constitution. Score = 0

3. Professional Civil Service: Hichilema replaced PF cadres who were DCs, with UPND cadres. He then proceeded to replace career civil servants who were PSs with his party cadres. Score = 0

4. Cost of Living: The prices of goods in shops are still very high and Hichilema has not put a single plan on the table of when or how these prices will reduce. Score = 0

5. Wastefulness: Despite claiming that the coffers are empty, Hichilema has been very wasteful with public money. He has employed the largest number of advisors than any other President, with a lot of duplication. For example, he has a Special Assistant for Economic Affairs (Jito) and also an Economic Advisor (Pamela), for the first time almost all ministries now have two Permanent Secretaries just so he can accommodate as many of his UPND members as possible. Score = 0

6. National Unity: Hichilema’s narrative that the previous administrations neglected Southern, Western and North-Western provinces has divided Zambia more than ever before. He keeps saying that he is uniting the nation and yet his actions are diving us. Score = 0

7. Arrogance: Hichilema lacks respect for the people that elected him into office. We understand that he might be facing challenges to fulfill his campaign promises, but he needs to explain that to the people in a sober manner. His statement that jobs don’t come from rocks is an insult to Zambians. Score = 0

8. Foreign Trips: We understand and appreciate the fact the a President has to travel to other countries to market Zambia, but in the case of Hichilema, it is his only preoccupation. So far, his 5 foreign trips have not yielded any tangible results in the form of a Trade Agreement or Foreign Direct Investment. Score = 0

9. Decision Making: Hichilema’s failure to decide on Government’s direction regarding the KCM liquidation and Mopani purchase agreement are causing huge uncertainty in the mining sector. Given the importance of mining to the overall welfare of our economy, we would have expected him to act quickly. But hey, even simply picking PSs and DCs took him 3 months. He is very slow for someone who came from the private sector. Score = 0.

10. Setting Priorities: We know that there are always competing needs when you are running a country, but certain things require to be prioritized. For instance, Hichilema has no excuse for failing to raise K318 million to pay farmers who sold maize to Government in Eastern Province. This is an urgent matter and any President who knows how to prioritize national matters should have addressed it. Besides, it is only one Province that is waiting to be paid. Score = 0

Overall rating of Hichilema’s 100 days in office is 0/10.

By Fred M’membe

While I strongly encourage and urge everyone to vaccinate, I find the talk by the government of mandatory COVID-19 vaccinations frightening. Let’s persuade, plead with our people to take COVID-19 vaccinations, but let’s avoid blackmailing them into doing so. Vaccinations should never be mandatory. It is a very serious human rights violation to make vaccinations compulsory.

Human rights conventions demand that a person must not be subjected to medical treatment without his or her full, free, and informed consent. And because vaccination is a medical procedure, forcing a person to be vaccinated against his or her will is a clear violation of this right.

Every person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, and that a person must not be coerced or restrained in a way that limits his or her freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief in observance or practice. Conscience is a person’s conviction as to what is right and wrong. Some people may object on political grounds, believing that it is not the proper role of government to force people to be vaccinated, even if they do not object in principle to vaccination. Some people are genuinely concerned that receiving a vaccination poses a substantial risk of physical injury or harm. Some people may object on religious grounds to being vaccinated.

For all these categories of people, forcing a person to be vaccinated violates that person’s freedom of conscience or religious beliefs, or forces them to do something they believe is potentially harmful. Underlying all the rights protected by human rights conventions is the concept of autonomy and dignity. Each person has the right to determine for himself or herself matters of bodily integrity including whether to be vaccinated.

Under international human rights law, especially Article 4(2) of the ICCPR, certain rights are non-derogable, even in a time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation — that is, the rights cannot be limited under any circumstances. Non-derogable rights include the right not to be subjected to medical experimentation (contained in article 7). In other words, there are no countervailing rights or considerations which would make it legitimate to force someone to undergo medical experimentation or treatment without their consent.

This is an indication that the right not to be subjected to medical treatment is a fundamental right and cannot be set aside in the interests of other policy goals. Therefore, although an international treaty cannot override the interpretation of domestic legislation, international law provides a strong indication that the right not to be subjected to medical treatment is an absolute right that cannot be limited. This ought to set a very high bar on any attempt to mandate forms of medical treatment — including vaccination.

The right not to be subjected to medical treatment recognises each person’s autonomy: that every person’s body is not a disposable object to be subjected under the perceived common good. Imposing mandatory vaccination on every citizen needs to be recognised as a clear breach of this commitment to uphold rights. It is troubling that the rights supposedly protected by the ICCPR can be so easily overridden.

Mandatory vaccination has significant implications for human rights and the nature of government power which need to be clearly understood. For a start, it has implications for the nature of consent.

Despite this clear requirement for free consent, the foreshadowed vaccine mandate means very Zambian will need to be vaccinated, regardless of their personal views. This arguably poses an alarming precedent.

If a person can be forced against his or her will to be vaccinated for the common good, does this signal an erosion of bodily autonomy?
Mandatory vaccination signals that there is no area of life exempt from political and governmental control. Even fundamental questions of human autonomy and bodily integrity are now subject to regulation by the state.

Finally, compulsory vaccination treats the decision as to whether to be vaccinated or not as a decision that needs to be made on our behalf by others. Every problem in society is a technocratic problem for governments and experts to solve. This effectively infantilises the population, treating people as if they cannot be trusted to make responsible decisions. And yet democracy is predicated on the principle of popular sovereignty, the idea that the government is elected by and accountable to the people. We can be trusted to determine who will govern us but not fundamental questions of our own bodily integrity.

Many will agree with compulsory vaccination, but this sets a precedent of government control which is unlikely to stop with vaccination.